As the riots broke out last month, five old criminologists were eating in a curry restaurant in central Manchester, past which the breeze carried the smell of Miss Selfridge burning half a mile up the road.
Those present included a former deputy research director of the Police Foundation in Washington DC, a former acting head of the Home Office Police Research Group, a former policeman and author of several books on psychology for police officers and prolific researchers on the subjects of knife crime and child abuse.
Between them they had perhaps a century and a half of relevant experience.
Inevitably, the following question was raised: ‘If the Government asked about controlling the riots, what advice would you give?’
Has criminology anything to say?
An extended silence followed. Two of us were sufficiently embarrassed to spend the night trying to work out whether criminology had anything useful to say.
We began our considered response by stating two beliefs:
- the national media and politicians’ criticism of the police service while the riots were in progress wa unfair, unrealistic and distasteful
- the riots themselves were almost wholly unconnected with the initial police shooting in Tottenham, and consisted of two elements – theft and arson – with different targets (a largely male-centric mob set Miss Selfridge alight, but not PC World
The riots were then instrumental rather than expressive, designed to ‘enrich’ the rioters thanks to the incidental thrill and kudos (in some quarters) of participation.
There has been a general rush to judgement on the riots. ‘Robocop’ Ray Mallon argues for policing unconstrained by political correctness.
Social commentator Claude Henry opines that rioters are sucked in by an adrenaline rush.
We take a different perspective. Namely, how could we organise everyday commerce in a way which minimises the opportunities for, and the profit from, riotous behaviour?
Looting: not a random exercise
Looting was not random, but rather focused on high value electrical and sports clothing stores or similar. Yet the technology exists for electronic goods to be designed to be tracked or disabled if stolen. We already do this for cars and phones, and there would be no point in stealing a flat screen TV if it didn’t work when plugged-in.
Likewise, clothing could (and should) have tamper-proof tags attached that damage the product if illicitly removed. These are elegant solutions that do not make burglary harder but remove the incentive.
Security shutters that can be prised open (as they were in August) and ‘unbreakable’ glass that shatters are also self-defeating.
Smartwater offers a product to spray on intruders automatically when they enter a premise. This is invisible in normal illumination but shows up (for several weeks) under ultraviolet light. Interviews with burglars have shown its deterrent effect.
Ironically, smoke can be used to protect rather than destroy. Security producs such as SmokeCloak, Smoke Bandit, Fog Bandit or Concept Smoke Screen solutions dispense a substance which limits vision and renders looting more problematic.
Making product serial numbers available
Stolen phones, a key target, can be tracked or ‘blacklisted’ so they do not work. Each handset’s unique identifier – its IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number – is recorded by retailers such as the Carphone Warehouse and Phones4U.
In fact, all looted businesses should make product serial numbers available such that stolen products are identified immediately when they surface. If businesses do not keep records of their stock we should reluctantly consider making it mandatory, as seemingly mundane record-keeping reduces many types of shrinkage and ‘chicanery’.
‘Fences’ and sellers of ‘second-hand’ stolen goods warrant close police attention over the coming weeks.
BlackBerry is in the frame for allegedly facilitating and amplifying the riots. Its free instant messaging (IM) allows one-to-many messages, so individuals organised group movements.
Unlike Twitter, IM is private and so less vulnerable to police interception.
Streatham MP Chuka Umunna suggested IM be disabled after 6.00 pm each evening. Perhaps the phones of early arrestees can be monitored in real-time or used for disinformation? Such measures warrant consideration.
However, note the recurrence of phones as both targets and facilitators of the riot. If the mobile phone industry takes greater responsibility for its products – one of us has been studying its intransigence for years in relation to handset theft and robbery – major reductions in crime could result.
45% of serious fires at businesses classed as arson
The Arson Prevention Bureau notes that 45% of serious fires at businesses are arson and recommends 24 routine preventive measures. These include a metal container inside the letter box and not leaving combustible materials lying around after closing.
We suspect such advice is rarely heeded and that specialist measures are rarer still. The burned-out Miss Selfridge in Manchester might have opened for business the next day if it had flat-panel shutters rather than a grill that allowed a burning rag to be pushed through it.
The use and control of accelerants should be reviewed: enforced restrictions on purchasing by age is the obvious measure.
The other main arson target in thes riots was cars, where fire-retardant design options would benefit insurers and owners alike.
The movements of rioting groups should also be studied for lessons because urban planning affects flows, proximity and access to targets plus natural and formal surveillance levels. Design of residential areas and buildings greatly affects crime rates, while alley gates and other measures can significantly reduce it.
Security: too slight an emphasis in commerce
Our main argument is simple: security measures already exist to reduce everyday crime but are not generally implemented, essentially because security is given too slight an emphasis in commerce, with consequent costs in police and suffering (including the deaths of those seeking to prevent the extreme manifestations of crime which we have witnessed).
Improved car security provides the best explanation for the general decline in vehicle crime throughout the Western world since 1990. Just as vaccination is the best approach to the most life-threatening diseases, so designing-out crime must form the best first line of defence against riots.
None of this is to excuse the rioters or blame the shopkeepers: just to counsel a re-ordering of priorities in less troubled times which will then pay its highest dividends in more troubled times.
The last month should have encouraged greater respect for an embattled police service. Moreover, the overnight stints of magistrates suggests a much-maligned criminal justice system mobilising quickly. On top of that, community participation in clean-ups has been heart-warming.
Perhaps there could be a Big Society after all. Within it, the appropriate role for the coalition Government is to promote a mix of regulation and incentives that nudge urban planners, manufacturers and retailers to consider secure design as the default option.
Graham Farrell and Ken Pease are professors of criminology at Loughborough University