Last month, Infologue.com’s Editor Bobby Logue raised an important question when requesting the Regulator to release the critical Delivery Review for public consumption. The document that, at least in part, had resulted in the departure of (then) Security Industry Authority (SIA) chief executive Mike Wilson.
At a recent meeting convened by the International Professional Security Association (IPSA), members brought up the lack of openness of the SIA and requested the International Council to publicise their concerns.
The SIA, of course, has since released two documents scripted by itself – a summary of the Delivery Review and a document outlining progress made to date against some of the criticisms. What we still haven’t seen is the original document.
Is there something to hide?
What is it that the Regulator and/or the Home Office is refusing to tell us all? Why was it decided by the Board that the best course of action was to force out the chief executive within days of receiving the report?
Was Mike Wilson considered by the Board to be so ineffective that he wasn’t to be given the chance of rectifying the highlighted problems?
Surely many of the issues raised actually relate to management practices put in place from Day One?
Looking through the released documents, some items are of no surprise. There are a number of criticisms about working with Stakeholders and enforcement – areas in which the Regulator had begun improvements last year, and those have continued since November.
For a body which has added countless levels of administrative burden to the industry, and instigated an inspection scheme which strays far away from quality of service delivery, it appears that the Regulator itself has been lacking in numerous areas of Best Practice.
What’s going to be done about the situation?
While it’s nice to hear that some people have now been moved from temporary to permanent contracts and will receive appraisals (once a third party contractor has been appointed for this), what we want to know more about is the failings that have occurred in service delivery – and, more importantly, what will be done about them.
At the present time, we still have:
- Call Centre staff that give out incorrect advice (which, in certain cases, could lead to a person unwittingly committing a criminal offence). Just how difficult is it to grasp the fact that a security dog handler is also a security officer?
- No clear escalation procedure for the more difficult queries channelled through the Call Centre. If it isn’t on the script, say: “I will call you back”… and then don’t bother
- Application forms being rejected for small reasons that a phone call could clarify. It’s far easier to post everything back to the applicant, irrespective of the fact this delays them obtaining their licence by a week and possibly prevents them from working during that period. How about some customer service? Even Licence Dispensation Notices (LDNs) do not help here, as the application has not been accepted.
- Applications that, for no obvious reason, become “stuck in the system”. Mavis falling ill or taking a holiday while the application is sat on her desk shouldn’t be a reason to prevent somebody from working.
The Regulator is supposed to be transparent
We have to accept the SIA. We don’t have a choice. The Regulator is the sole provider of the licenses required by law for security staff to work in this industry.
As a Government-appointed body, the SIA is supposed to be transparent. We want to know that they’re aware of problems still in the system, and we want to know what they will be doing to improve their procedures.
Don’t misunderstand me. The SIA has already significantly improved on the initial systems set in motion, but there’s still room for improvement. The industry (and the SIA’s end customers, the Stakeholders) wish to be a part of the journey, not simply taken along for a ride.