The United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation has approved and moved on an Air Cargo Security Act aimed at strengthening security on flights into the US – notably on the busy Transatlantic run, writes Philip Fine.
The proposed legislation dovetails neatly with provisions agreed by the Committee in 2002 concerning the whole issue of aviation security. Assuming that the legislation is passed into law, it would impose a series of responsibilities on non-American companies – including security companies here in the UK. The Act entails:
- the creation of a database of established ‘shippers’ whereupon there is complete confidence that they are abiding by the law (UK companies would have to be included on this so-called ‘Known Shipper’ programme);
- indirect air carriers having their US certificates revoked if Washington’s Transportation Security Agency (TSA) finds that they are not adhering to security laws and/or regulations;
- review of the existing federal security programme for indirect air carriers – it would be assessed for possible improvements;
- the development (by the TSA) of a security training programme which would be imposed on those who handle air cargo within the US;
- the development by ALL cargo carriers of security plans that would be subject to approval by the TSA.
Several amendments have already been written into the proposed legislation that have a direct effect on air passenger security. These include a requirement for a report on the impact on privacy and civil liberties of the controversial Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System that has been proposed by the TSA and the creation of guidelines for verifying passenger identification.
The pre-Act Congressional Bill is now ready for full Senate consideration, and could well reach the House of Representatives during the next couple of months.
According to EU officials the devices – which were attached to telephone lines at the central switchboard – were discovered during a routine sweep. Apparently, telephones used by the British, French, German, Spanish, Italian and Austrian ministerial delegations had apparently been compromised by the bugging devices (themselves described by officials as being “unusually sophisticated”).
It has not become clear as to why EU Council communications should be targeted in this way.
Although some traffic between delegations in Brussels and their Home Offices could have been intercepted, officials insisted that communications which required the highest levels of security would be conducted through safe channels at the respective Embassies.