The soldier captured on the battlefield… The passenger taken hostage onboard a cruise ship or an airliner… The businessman, charity worker or journalist leaving an air conditioned hotel only to be bundled into a waiting car, driven to an unknown location and then thrown into a dusty cell… The oil baron seized in a raid…
Running throughout these scenarios are common denominators. All of those individuals mentioned will likely have been seized by people speaking a foreign language. There will probably be a good deal of shoving and shouting going on. They’ll be blindfolded. They’ll have no idea when the next meal or drink is going to appear, much less idea what is going to become of them. When will they return home? Of course, they will also be thinking the obvious: “Why me?”
Soldiers expect to be captured because of the nature of ground fighting. In some instances, capture is inevitable. Mass surrender must occur when there is no alternative. Being taken prisoner is simply an extension of the battlefield, with every prisoner duty-bound to try and escape and make life as difficult as possible for the enemy.
These days, most aircrew and sailors do not expect capture but, as we’ve seen with the Iranian (and now the Iraqi) incident, both they and security personnel can find themselves taken hostage only to be used as pawns in a political game aimed at fuelling propaganda.
Tourists and travellers, executives, journalists and charity workers do not expect to be captured or taken hostage either, but when they are, they can find themselves seized by apolitical captors who view them as expendable commodities for sale.
The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention
Civilians who find themselves in war zones are protected by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War).
Persons accompanying members of the Armed Forces – including journalists, security and supply contractors and those providing welfare services – are also protected, provided they possess an identity card. Those that fail to abide by the above risk prosecution – as long as they can be arrested.
Diplomats are protected by international law, protocol and agreements, but this has not prevented their capture (remember the 444 US diplomats held by the Iranian revolutionary Government back in the early 1980s?). Compared to the number of US citizens held in aircraft hijacks during the period, the US response of an attempted military rescue of its diplomats, coupled with the unwillingness of some Governments to negotiate, shows where the average citizen sits in the pecking order.
Further rules on governing the protection of civilians were developed within Protocol 1, which supplements the Geneva Conventions by protecting victims who find they are “fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.”
Disregard for the law
The second Protocol relates to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. Signed in June 1977, this set out to protect non-combatants caught up in internal security operations, in particular where dissident Armed Forces – or other organised armed groups under responsible command – exercise such control over a part of its territory. This Protocol does not apply to internal disturbances, riots and isolated (sporadic) acts of violence, as they are not considered to be armed conflicts.
While it is probably of some comfort to civilians caught up in war zones that they are protected by international law through the Conventions, it’s a sad fact of life that some Governments and insurgency groups often have little or no knowledge of them. Either that or they choose to ignore them, believing that war is fought without rules. Witness the execution of hostages in Iraq – some of them beamed ‘live’ across the nation – the activities of Government-sponsored Arab militia in the Sudan, the mutilation of civilians in Sierra Leone and the heinous murders carried out by the Taliban in Afghanistan.
For militias, volunteer corps and organised resistance movements to be afforded protection, under Article 4 they must fulfil all of the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his or her subordinates (b) that of having a fixed, distinctive sign which is recognisable at a distance (c) that of carrying arms openly (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
The depositing of explosive devices in areas used by civilians does not adhere to Article 4 (d) because it does not conform to the historical laws and customs of war. Bombers attacking civilian targets, such as factories, are permissible because Governments are expected to provide air defence and shelters (as did the North Vietnamese during their drawn out conflict with the United States).
Conduct-after-capture policy
Following on from inquiries after the interrogations and political exploitation of United Nations Prisoners of War by the North Koreans, Soviet and Chinese interrogators during the Korean War, the UK – along with several other Western nations – agreed that their conduct-after-capture policy would now follow Article 17 of the 1929 Third Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War)…
“Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth and army, regimental, personal or serial number or, failing this, equivalent information. If he wilfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.”
This information is required by the International Committee of the Red Cross such that prisoners may be traced. The information required is frequently referred to as The Big Four and, while entirely suited to conventional war, the British experience post-1945 suggests it’s not so appropriate for asymmetric warfare in which militias, volunteer corps and organised resistance movements either disregard international law or are selective with its application. The calculated British response to questions other than The Big Four is:
Another major problem for prisoners of war is that capturing nations may not accept that they have been captured on the battlefield and, accusing them of criminality, then deny them their rights. The British policy is that those graded prone-to-capture (for example air crew and members of the Special Forces) must be given practical conduct-after-capture training.
Important intelligence resource
The Geneva Convention recognises that prisoners of war are an important intelligence resource. Consequently, interrogation is permitted (within strict rules) under Article 17: “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatsoever.”
Interrogators are permitted to use tricks and ploys and manipulate information in the pursuit of intelligence that may affect the course of the conflict. Article 17 also states: “The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language they understand.”
When the conduct-after-capture strategy was tested during the Gulf War, several prone-to-capture British prisoners found that surviving interrogation by sticking to The Big Four was extremely difficult.
The ‘Iran 15’: lessons to be learned
Seized by strangers alleging armed trespass and denied access to legal or diplomatic advice, the ‘Iran 15’ faced a dilemma. The UK was not at war with Iran, and yet evidence suggests the Iranian Revolutionary Guard treated them as prisoners of war. The 15 Royal Navy and Royal Marines operatives had little choice but to collaborate. They were being accused of a crime and had no reason to stick to The Big Four.
Much to the disappointment of the national media, one suspects, the 15 were neither assaulted nor abused. The apparent clicking of rifle bolts was, without doubt, a measure to reinforce the shock of capture (particularly as the detainees had just arrived at a formidable prison in Tehran). The removal of uniforms was standard. Uniforms need to be searched. It’s also a psychological weapon to attack any identities a prisoner may want to retain.
During the whole process, Iranian ‘success’ continued – unwittingly – when several blunders undermined the reputation of our Armed Forces, in particular the Royal Navy. Yet another bastion of national pride dismantled by political incompetence.
Security professionals: the response
The seizure of the ‘Iran 15’ begs the question: ‘To what extent should security managers in the UK prepare members of staff for being kidnapped or held hostage?’
Far-fetched though some of the examples cited here might be, they do tell a story. Few airline companies offer any advice to passengers about hijackings. To what extent were the diplomats kidnapped in Somalia earlier this year given any training on surviving captivity? How many senior executives truly understand the psychological consequences of being taken hostage?
Probably the most vulnerable hostages are those without diplomatic protection. Their bargaining power is low – unless they are an expendable commodity to be sold or can be transformed into the ‘star’ of a video nasty. Worse, they may be seen as a propaganda tool to pressurise Government – witness the tragic case involving Ken Biggley.
I’ll leave you with this question: “To what extent is the failure to give employees working in areas where kidnapping and/or hostage-taking is rife an adequate briefing on conduct after seizure a lapse in Duty of Care?”
