The UK Government’s recent security review by Lord West has undoubtedly increased the emphasis placed on the strength and design of security measures required to protect crowded places, the built environment, transportation and the entirety of our Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).
As you’d expect, the major engineering and architectural design, project management and consultancy services groups are addressing the issue with gusto. One such – TPS, part of Carillion plc – offers blue chip companies a wide range of services including security systems design, security advice, blast engineering and counter-terrorism education, its clients including central and local Government.
Nothing beats ‘taking the message to the people’, and TPS has certainly bought into this edict. On 20 February, the company hired The Wren Suite in St Paul’s Cathedral and hosted a high level seminar on blast mitigation in the built environment. There was a first class chairman – Patrick Mercer OBE MP, a member of Lord West’s review team – and excellent contributions from Darius Aibara (an associate director with TPS) and DI Kevin Bolton from the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), more of which anon.
I didn’t recognise many faces when I arrived for registration at breakfast just prior to the 9.00 am start, but Mark Whyte (TPS’ director of security consultancy and explosive effects) was on hand to point out a few of the luminaries in the audience.
One face I did recognise was that of Stephen Kennett, a colleague of mine at CMP Information who used to work on Building Services Journal (BSJ) and is now technical editor with Building, one of the company’s flagship weekly titles. Stephen is a supremely talented young journalist who, together with editor Andy Pearson, elevated BSJ to new heights. He’ll soon be writing a feature on protective facades and glazing systems, which is why he was there.
Considering Project Contest
Patrick Mercer was first elected to Parliament in 1991, having completed nine tours in Northern Ireland. The Tory MP for Newark and Retford, he introduced himself (post-tea and a bacon roll) as “probably the most sacked man in the Conservative Party”!!!! A good attention grabber, and so was the next part of his opening address as chairman in which he introduced Project Contest.
A show of hands in the audience revealed a stunning lack of knowledge on this Labour initiative, which centres on the Government’s review of counter-terrorism strategies. I knew of this, as Patrick has just written an article on the matter for the February print edition of Security Management Today (SMT).
One of the strands in Project Contest centres on preventing terrorism, and it’s here where much of the emphasis is being placed just now. “In my role as Shadow Homeland Security Minister,” opined Mercer, “the most difficult of my tasks was trying to convince people in Westminster that adequate protection from the terrorist threat is a realistic possibility. The terrorists only need to succeed once, and if they do there is always tremendous political, economic and social debris to be cleaned away. As politicians, I have to say that far too many of us are bad at acknowledging and understanding so much might be done to mitigate the threat.”
Mercer described working with Lord West last summer as “fascinating”. He suggested in no uncertain terms that 9/11 and 7/7 were “huge wake-up calls” for the UK in countering the terrorist threat. “There is still so much to be done,” said the MP, who referred to the “interesting” political debates being had at the present time in relation to terrorist detention laws. “There’s a good deal of political manoeuvring going on,” explained Mercer, who feels that it’s “almost inevitable” there will be a massive attack on the UK mainland at some point.
“If this country can prepare itself to defend against the same kind of mental and physical stresses placed upon it in the 1940s, then we will have truly achieved something vital.”
Blast mitigation: the threat
According to Darius Aibara, today’s physical threat stems from several sources: improvised bombs, mortar attacks, rocket-propelled devices, ballistic attacks, incendiary devices and CBRN.
There has been a good deal of research completed on improvised bombs. In terms of blast loading, Aibara brought up a useful image on Powerpoint of what happens to a building post-blast. I have first hand knowledge of this, as my former company (The Builder Group) was located right across the road from the IRA lorry bomb at South Quay in Docklands back in February 1996.
“There’s reflected pressure and side-on overpressure,” suggested Aibara. “The crater that a bomb causes can eliminate power supplies, too.” Yes. It very definitely can! In the aftermath of the London Bishopsgate bombings, some of the non-steel framed buildings were totally destroyed.
Steven and I were both keen to hear what Darius had to say about glazing systems. “Laminated glazing is the best type to install,” commented Aibara. “Annealed glass will typically travel at 10 metres per second post-blast, and will shred the occupants.” Aibara demonstrated the fact (without the human shredding, of course!) with videos of a recent test. The video for the laminated glass testing showed no shards entering the building at all.
The blast pressure effects on human can be quite horrific. I didn’t realise the extent of this myself until Darius told us all. Temporary hearing loss will occur anywhere up to 300 metres from a car bomb, for example. Ear drum rupture (in other words permanent hearing loss) occurs just 55 metres from the blast, with lung damage (which could be fatal) taking place anything up to just 40 metres away.
Countering the threat
So what can be done to mitigate the threat? Aibara recommends the inclusion of stand-off areas (around buildings), enhanced glazing and door systems for “target hardening” and bomb refuge (or ‘invacuation’ areas), and stressed the requirement for operational continuity at all times.
At this juncture, Darius clicked on to an ‘idealised’ building design. As we were treated to a 3D ‘fly-through’ of the structure, it was plain to see the inclusion of elements like anti-ram bollards for perimeter protection. Interesting to note was Aibara’s comment that people and post should be screened well away from the main building before being granted entry. You don’t see this tactic invoked too often, do you?
The effects of blasts might also be nullified by structural tying to prevent progressive collapse. “The lower columns should always be encased in concrete,” explained Darius. “Laminated glazing should be used in deep frames with rebates. That glazing must also be glued into the frame using structural silicone.” Apparently, a hard gasket with a deep frame rebate is a good compromise. All of the cladding must allow for easy removal and replacement.
I’ve often wondered why precious architectural types insist on littering today’s buildings with glass? It might look nice and pretty, but the people working inside probably fry during the summer and, if laminated glazing isn’t specified, well… “Extensive glazing should always be avoided,” stressed Aibara. “So must basement areas that extend beyond the building line, overhanging floors [particularly at low levels] and any sort of car parking area below of within the building.” The (first) failed attack on the Twin Towers proved why the latter point must be heeded.
How to take refuge
The m&e services must be top class in any refuge areas designated. Let’s be fair, it could be some time before anyone who’s trapped in the building’s ‘safe house’ is able to escape, so they’re going to need air and water. “There has to be a duality of service supplies, such as power, water and gas,” opined Aibara, “and a hardening of critical facilities like Control Rooms, which should be located away from the Post Room and at a high level. Don’t forget about alternative operating locations, too.”
That last point is a good one. Lots of the companies on Hemel Hempstead’s main Industrial Estate were put out of business post-Buncefield because they had no contingency plans in place.
Hostile vehicle mitigation came to the forefront of the security agenda when BBC Television Centre in west London was attacked in March 2001 by a 20 lb IRA bomb planted in a taxi. Security managers need to determine whether the threat is permanent or temporary, passive or active? If it’s active, is a vehicle search required? Aibara talked about using Hesco bastions and physical landscaping (in the form of chicanes) to slow down approaching vehicles.
“Ditches and berms are also a good ploy,” added Aibara, “but you must make sure the dimensions are correct. If you’re not sure, take a look at PAS 68 2007: Specification for Vehicle Security Barriers and PAS 69 2006: Guidance for the Selection, Installation and Use of Vehicle Security Barriers. Bear in mind that these documents refer to European installations. If you’re working on an American project the design guidance will be different.”
Response from the NaCTSO
The Government, the police service and MI5 are all deeply concerned about the terrorist threat facing us the UK.They have every right to be. There are over 2,000 individuals and 200 networks of potential terrorists roaming around our streets, cities and towns. 30 active plots have been closely monitored. The likelihood of regular events is not an impossibility by any means.
“The Haymarket and Glasgow Airport occurrences showed that we cannot uncover every plot,” suggested DI Kevin Bolton.
“One of the key questions is: ‘What are the terrorists trying to target?’ Most of the time, we don’t really know.” Two projects where the terrorists were thwarted were Operation Crevice and Operation Rhyme. DI Bolton explained what happened in both.
The former involved terrorist factions looking to target environments like football stadiums, the Bluewater Shopping Centre and the Ministry of Sound nightclub with ammonium nitrate fertiliser-based explosives. The latter was a “gas limousine project” targeting tall buildings with underground car parks.
“The threat level is currently severe across the whole of the UK,” added DI Bolton. “The likely targets are going to be those places where there are high concentrations of people. It’s the kind of scenario that’s difficult to defend.”
NaCTSO has produced useful guidance notes (to be found at www.nactso.gov.uk) entitled ‘Secure in the Knowledge’ and ‘Expecting the Unexpected’. There are also two useful booklets produced by the Centre for the Protection of Critical National Infrastructure (www.cpni.gov.uk) looking at personal security and document verification. Take a look at them.
As far as DI Bolton is concerned, Lord West’s report has identified “glaring gaps” in the counter-terrorism planning stage. “Architects and urban designers must pay far more attention to security issues.”
A change of Government
Concluding the morning’s proceedings, Patrick Mercer suggested that if his party were returned to power at the next General Election, there will be “many more incentives for companies to plough funds into counter-terrorism measures as a result of lower taxation and insurance rates. We need to make it less onerous for companies to look after their assets.”
