For many of us, 2009 began with the distressing scenes of the fire in a Bangkok nightclub which claimed over 60 lives. While it’s tempting to think that something like that couldn’t happen here Richard Coates believes it could, given the deteriorating state of UK fire safety and firefighting resources.
The Bangkok nightclub fire adds to the death toll that will continue to grow, as governments around the world fail to legislate for what has become the world’s most regular mass killer of people attending entertainment events. A fire in a nightclub is the last thing on anyone’s mind when alcohol fuels a heady mixture of spectacular lighting and thundering music. But could it happen here?
Across the UK, the provision of local authority fire protection services and the regulatory infrastructure can be seen to be diminishing rather than improving, as the true scale of the disarray within the government over its efforts to ‘modernise’ the British fire services and revolutionise fire safety legislation becomes apparent. One has to look no further than a recent issue of FSE (Dec 08/Jan 09) to see the evidence.
First off, Scottish ministers ordered an urgent inquiry after deaths from fire rose by 62%, injuries rose by 6%, and three firefighters died during 2007/2008 compared with the previous 12 months.
Then, new guidance (which was not part of the original planned set of guidance publications) has been rushed through to assist owners of bed and breakfast and similar accommodation, after the government’s previous fire minister refused to issue such guidance. Entitled Do You Have Paying Guests? the document is a tacit acknowledgement by the government that there has been no consistent enforcement of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (FSO) across the country by local authority fire and rescue services.
Speaking last November at a meeting of the Association of Specialist Fire Protection, its president and former chief fire officer of the London Fire Brigade, Brian Robinson, stated that “the evidence points to the fact that the RR(FS)O 2005, the CDM Regulations 2007 and Regulation 16B of the Building Regulations were not working properly, and that the latest fire statistics show that there was an increase in the cost of fire loss of nearly 23%”.
Fragmentation
In the same issue, the new chair of the government’s advisory body the Business and Community Safety Forum, Leslie Byrom, stated there has been “drift, fragmentation and compartmentalised thinking” and “roles have not been as clear as they should be” in regard to fire legislation. He added that there needed to be improvements in emphasis on sleeping accommodation, better knowledge of local risks and consistency in enforcement. Given that Leslie Byrom notes that one of the problems is a need for better local knowledge of risks rather than less, we should be thankful that the timetable to introduce the eight regional fire control centres has slipped. Local knowledge will be further diminished once these centres are in operation, thus further decreasing operational effectiveness in response. However, as fire minister Sadiq Khan noted in a written reply to parliament, one of the main purposes of the removal of local control rooms is to save GB pound 8 million a year. Implicit in this decision will be the loss of local knowledge that will go out the door with the current control room staff.
And finally in that issue, a letter from Mike Wood of the Association for Specialist Fire Protection highlighted the fact that reduced water pressure across the UK is now a common problem, as water supply utility companies cut pressure to reduce water leakage from underground mains. This is exemplified by Merseyside Fire & Rescue Authority which is considering action against water company United Utilities. According to Merseyside chief fire officer, Tony McGuirk, the situation has become so serious due to the lacklustre performance of the water supply, that there is a major risk of water shortage at large fires. Such fires could well include a large industrial, commercial or entertainment complex.
Other recent statements and publications show the continual downgrading of the operational effectiveness of UK fire and rescue services, which compounds the negative effects of self-regulation.
The Bangkok nightclub fire adds to the death toll that will continue to grow, as governments around the world fail to legislate for what has become the world’s most regular mass killer of people attending entertainment events. A fire in a nightclub is the last thing on anyone’s mind when alcohol fuels a heady mixture of spectacular lighting and thundering music. But could it happen here? Across the UK, the provision of local authority fire protection services and the regulatory infrastructure can be seen to be diminishing rather than improving, as the true scale of the disarray within the government over its efforts to ‘modernise’ the British fire services and revolutionise fire safety legislation becomes apparent. One has to look no further than a recent issue of FSE (Dec 08/Jan 09) to see the evidence.
For many of us, 2009 began with the distressing scenes of the fire in a Bangkok nightclub which claimed over 60 lives. While it’s tempting to think that something like that couldn’t happen here Richard Coates believes it could, given the deteriorating state of UK fire safety and firefighting resources.
First off, Scottish ministers ordered an urgent inquiry after deaths from fire rose by 62%, injuries rose by 6%, and three firefighters died during 2007/2008 compared with the previous 12 months.
Then, new guidance (which was not part of the original planned set of guidance publications) has been rushed through to assist owners of bed and breakfast and similar accommodation, after the government’s previous fire minister refused to issue such guidance. Entitled Do You Have Paying Guests? the document is a tacit acknowledgement by the government that there has been no consistent enforcement of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (FSO) across the country by local authority fire and rescue services.
Speaking last November at a meeting of the Association of Specialist Fire Protection, its president and former chief fire officer of the London Fire Brigade, Brian Robinson, stated that "the evidence points to the fact that the RR(FS)O 2005, the CDM Regulations 2007 and Regulation 16B of the Building Regulations were not working properly, and that the latest fire statistics show that there was an increase in the cost of fire loss of nearly 23%".
Fragmentation
In the same issue, the new chair of the government’s advisory body the Business and Community Safety Forum, Leslie Byrom, stated there has been "drift, fragmentation and compartmentalised thinking" and "roles have not been as clear as they should be" in regard to fire legislation. He added that there needed to be improvements in emphasis on sleeping accommodation, better knowledge of local risks and consistency in enforcement. Given that Leslie Byrom notes that one of the problems is a need for better local knowledge of risks rather than less, we should be thankful that the timetable to introduce the eight regional fire control centres has slipped.
Local knowledge will be further diminished once these centres are in operation, thus further decreasing operational effectiveness in response. However, as fire minister Sadiq Khan noted in a written reply to parliament, one of the main purposes of the removal of local control rooms is to save £8 million a year. Implicit in this decision will be the loss of local knowledge that will go out the door with the current control room staff.
And finally in that issue, a letter from Mike Wood of the Association for Specialist Fire Protection highlighted the fact that reduced water pressure across the UK is now a common problem, as water supply utility companies cut pressure to reduce water leakage from underground mains. This is exemplified by Merseyside Fire & Rescue Authority which is considering action against water company United Utilities. According to Merseyside chief fire officer, Tony McGuirk, the situation has become so serious due to the lacklustre performance of the water supply, that there is a major risk of water shortage at large fires. Such fires could well include a large industrial, commercial or entertainment complex.
Other recent statements and publications show the continual downgrading of the operational effectiveness of UK fire and rescue services, which compounds the negative effects of self-regulation.
In addition to these reports, the replacement of the 1964 Licensing Act with the Licensing Act 2003 – which came into effect in 2005 and placed both alcohol and entertainment licences in the hands of local authorities – has had a significant effect on diminishing the effective oversight of fire safety in entertainment premises, due to the lack of experience in local authority licensing teams. The annual renewal of a licence is now merely a request for the annual fee, a transfer of money without the need for any formal inspection or report on the premises concerned.
The responsibility for ensuring full compliance and reporting any changes to the premises or its operation is that of the premises owner. Having personal experience of the fire protection for a number of licensed premises, and tracing the annual renewal process for those licences back to source, I can confirm the potential for serious defects to be present in the safety of such premises, unless self-regulation is vigorously maintained and the enforcing authorities remain vigilant against any non-compliance.
Drain of expertise
With the disbanding of the two HM Fire Service Inspectorates that covered the UK, the only body currently auditing fire and rescue services is the Audit Commission, whose role is to safeguard the public finances. It does not investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of fire and rescue services by retaining experienced fire officers who understand the complexities of operational fire and rescue management. That the Audit Commission does not understand the interrelated nature of fire and rescue activities is amply illustrated in its recent report Rising to the Challenge. The report states that there is scope for £200 million savings to be trimmed from the £2bn spent annually on local authority fire services, including more use of retained personnel.
A look at the annual reports and IRMPs (Integrated Risk Management Plans) of fire and rescue authorities across the UK shows that in the past three years, well over 100 fire stations have closed, hundreds of fire appliances have been taken off the run to be used for training or community service work, and thousands of operational fire personnel have been redeployed to other work, with both full time and retained establishments reduced. Indeed, the government’s Operational Statistical Bulletin for 2007/08 notes that 11% more retained firefighters left the service than in the previous year. This starkly illustrates the disconnect between the reality of what is happening and the Audit Commission recommendations to cut millions from fire authority budgets, which are already pared down, and to make up operational deficiencies with retained personnel.
The lack of investment in the education of fire personnel and removal of the statutory examinations are now being felt on real operations. Officers in brigades in both Scotland and England, who do not want to be named, have said to me that the use of defensive firefighting tactics is now more widespread, because junior watch managers now coming through the system,have not had to put in long hours of studying across the topics such as building dynamics, hydraulics and chemistry. These managers are increasingly reluctant to commit fire crews into building fire situations, as they are not confident in their own understanding of what will happen to the building and its contents under fire conditions. Questions will continue to be asked about the role of dynamic risk assessment and the doctrine of ‘safe risk taking’ in this decision-making process, and how much this is contributing to the 23% increase in fire losses referred to by Brian Robinson. A number of fire and rescue services are now bringing back examinations, albeit on an ad-hoc basis at local level, in a bid to redress the balance.
Actions not words
In a statement to parliament which included references to forthcoming major changes in the UK fire services on 28 January 2003, the then deputy prime minister, John Prescott, said that modernisation would not lead to hundreds of fire station closures and that it was false and misleading to state that it would. As detailed above, this statement may now be seen not to hold water. Together with the many other issues outlined in this article, modernisation has led to the weakened state of UK fire legislation covering industrial, commercial, retail and entertainment premises. Add to this the current limitations of operational response to fire emergencies, again for the reasons outlined above, and it is very clear to see why an incident similar to that which occurred in Thailand could happen in the UK.
Having undertaken, like many other western expats, considerable fire protection work and some emergency fire response in a number of overseas locations, including developing countries, I have become used to limitations in the standards of fire protection legislation, the lack of education and training in some fire departments, the severe limitations of emergency fire response in others, and limited water supplies for firefighting. The reasons are many and varied but as later media reports on the Bangkok club fire showed, many of those who escaped the blaze were all too familiar with the limitations of building fire safety in the city, but decided to take the risk anyway. This acceptance of the high risk of fire is common in developing countries, but here in the UK do we really want to go back to a fragmented approach to fire protection, fire safety and emergency response, having taken decades to develop a comprehensive regime using a common approach?
I would urge both fire service leaders and government ministers in England and Scotland to reconsider many of the legislative changes made across the UK – particularly those affecting fire safety regulations, guidance and operational fire response practices and procedures – before the combination of self regulation and reductions in operational fire resources lead to a tragedy on the scale of the Bangkok nightclub fire, here in the UK.
Richard Coates MIFireE FCMI MIAFC is a fire safety consultant. He started his career in the fire and rescue service as a firefighter and rose to chief fire officer, then was a senior course director at the Fire Service College, and worldwide fire adviser for BP International. The majority of the issues referring to the RR(FS)O 2005 also affect the Fire Scotland Act 2005 and the Fire Safety (Scotland) Regulations 2006.
